

Static Analysis (1/2)

Martin Kellogg

Static Analysis (Part 1/2)

Today's agenda:

- Reading Quiz
- Motivations for static analysis
- Basics of dataflow analysis

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- B. never warns about line X unless there is definitely a bug on line X
- C. both A and B
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 - **testing**, the most common
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Today's goal: discuss other **automated** static analysis techniques that complement testing and code review in a quality assurance process

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This is especially true for certain kinds of hard-to-test-for defects that might not be apparent even if you do exercise them, such as **resource leaks**

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 - Resource leaks: memory, OS resources
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 - Exceptions: arithmetic, library, user-defined
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There are **rules** for doing each of these things **correctly**, and a static analysis can automate those rules.

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- an **abstraction**, in this context, is a **selective representation** of the program that is simpler to analyze
 - **key idea:** the abstraction will have fewer states to explore
 - hopefully, many fewer!

Key ideas in static analysis design

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 - Handle “I don't know”: think about developers
- Programs **As Data**
 - Programs are just trees, graphs or strings
 - And we know how to analyze and manipulate those (e.g., visit every node in a graph)

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 - **semantics** is a fancy word for “meaning”
 - semantics are relevant for properties related to **context** - that is, where the question to be decided depends on the rest of the program

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
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Definition: an **abstract syntax tree** (or **AST**) is a tree-based representation of a program's syntactic structure

- usually produced by a **parser**
- nodes in the tree represent syntactic constructs
 - parent-child relationships in the AST represent **compound expressions** in the source code (e.g., a “plus node” might have two children: the left and right side expressions)


Treating programs as data: AST example

Example: $5 + (2 + 3)$




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Treating programs as data: AST example

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grouping parentheses and other disambiguation is no longer necessary (AST is unambiguous, unlike text)

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- this is the internal representation used by static analysis tools

Treating programs as data: three ways

CFG example on the whiteboard

Dataflow analysis

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 - Dataflow analyses take programs as input

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1. an analysis for finding **definite** null-pointer dereferences

“Whenever execution reaches `*ptr` at program location `L`, `ptr` will be `NULL`”

2. an analysis for finding **potential** secure information leaks

“We read in a secret string at location `L`, but there is a possible future public use of it”

Definite vs potential

A “**definite**” null-pointer dereference exists if and only if the pointer is NULL on **every** program execution

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The use of “**every**” and “**any**” here guarantee that we must reason about **all paths** through the program!

Definite vs potential = false positives vs negatives

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
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
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
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


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


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


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


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- Property P is typically **undecidable**

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“**interesting**” in this context means “not trivial”, i.e., not uniformly true or false for all programs

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Rice's theorem caveats:

- only applies to **semantic** properties (syntactic properties are decidable)
- "programs" only includes programs **with loops**

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- An **algorithm** always terminates
 - So a dataflow analysis algorithm must terminate even if the input program loops
- This is one source of **imprecision**
 - “**imprecision**” = “not always getting the right answer”
 - Suppose you dereference the null pointer on the 500th iteration but we only analyze 499 iterations

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 - this is called *conservative* analysis

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Definition: a **complete** program analysis has no false positives

- always answers “I don't know” if there isn't a **definite** bug

Soundness vs completeness

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 - also relevant in practice: “fast”, “easy to use”, etc.

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 - most common exception: most **type systems** are sound
 - remember: type systems are just another static analysis
 - few complete analyses exist in practice
 - theory is underdeveloped, but another area of active research!

Null-pointer analysis example

Question: is `ptr` *always* null when it is dereferenced?

```
ptr = new AVL();  
if (B > 0)
```

```
graph TD; A["ptr = new AVL();  
if (B > 0)"] --> B["ptr = 0;"]; A --> C["X = 2 * 3;"]; B --> D["print(ptr->data);"]; C --> D;
```

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

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Static analysis (2/2?)

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- nullness analysis: how it works
- secure information flow analysis
- limitations of static analysis
- static analysis in practice

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Announcements:

- reminder: revised project plan due today (submit on Canvas)
- optional reading #1 due at the end of the week
 - Saturday night
- sprint 1 mentor meetings: schedule for ~3/20, 3/21

Static analysis (2/2?)

- **reading quiz**
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Reading Quiz: static analysis (2)

Q1: **TRUE** or **FALSE**: the verifier described by the author is too expensive to run in continuous integration, so AWS provisioned special weekly jobs to re-check the codebase

Q2: **TRUE** or **FALSE**: to use the verifier, engineers were taught how to use a special, declarative programming language that was not similar to their regular development language (C). The author's ICSE paper reports on how easy it was to teach this language to C developers.

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
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
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Null-pointer analysis example

Question: is `ptr` *always* null when it is dereferenced?



NO: only sometimes null



YES: always null

Null-pointer analysis example: abstraction

Formalizing our reasoning:

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
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 - \top (“top”) = “don’t know if X is a constant”
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 - \perp (“bottom”) = “ X has no value here”

Null-pointer analysis example: formalized


Get out a piece of paper. Fill in these blanks:



Recall:
 T = "don't know"
 c = constant
 \perp = unreachable

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 - Simply inspect the $x = ?$ associated with a statement using x
 - If x is the constant **0** at that point, issue a warning!
- But how can an **algorithm** compute $x = ?$

Key idea behind dataflow analysis

*The analysis of a complicated program can be expressed as a combination of **simple rules** relating the change in information between **adjacent statements***

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
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Definition: a *transfer function* expresses the relationship between $C_{in}(x, s)$ and $C_{out}(x, s)$

Transfer functions: rule 1




$C_{\text{out}}(x, x := c) = c$ if c is a constant


Transfer functions: rule 2

$$C_{\text{out}}(x, s) = \perp \text{ if } C_{\text{in}}(x, s) = \perp$$

Recall $\perp =$
“unreachable code”




Transfer functions: rule 3



$$C_{\text{out}}(x, x := f(\dots)) = T$$


Transfer functions: rule 3

This is a **conservative approximation!** $f(\dots)$ might always return 0, but we don't even try!



$$C_{\text{out}}(x, x := f(\dots)) = T$$


Transfer functions: rule 4



$$C_{\text{out}}(x, y := \dots) = C_{\text{in}}(x, y := \dots) \text{ if } x \neq y$$

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
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Transfer functions: rule 4

How hard is it to check if $x \neq y$ on all executions? (oh no)



$$C_{\text{out}}(x, y := \dots) = C_{\text{in}}(x, y := \dots) \text{ if } x \neq y$$

Propagation between statements

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
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- In the following rules, let statement s have immediate predecessor statements p_1, \dots, p_n


Transfer functions: rule 5



if $C_{\text{out}}(x, p_i) = T$ for some i , then $C_{\text{in}}(x, s) = T$


Transfer functions: rule 5

If there's **any** path on which we don't know, then we don't know at all




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Transfer functions: rule 6



if $C_{\text{out}}(x, p_i) = c$ and $C_{\text{out}}(x, p_j) = d$ and $d \neq c$ then $C_{\text{in}}(x, s) = T$


Transfer functions: rule 6



We **don't know** which of the paths a given execution will take (so assume T)

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
Transfer functions: rule 7



if $C_{\text{out}}(x, p_i) = c$ or \square for all i , then $C_{\text{in}}(x, s) = c$


Transfer functions: rule 7

If x has the **same** value (or \square) on all input edges, it has that value in s



if $C_{\text{out}}(x, p_i) = c$ or \square for all i , then $C_{\text{in}}(x, s) = c$

Transfer functions: rule 8



if $C_{out}(x, p_i) = \square$ for all i , then $C_{in}(x, s) = \square$

A static analysis algorithm

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- For every **entry point** e to the program, set $C_{in}(x, e) = T$

A static analysis algorithm

Definition: an *entry point* of a program is any program location L for which there exists an execution trace beginning with L

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
This is a **fixpoint** (or **fixed point**) **iteration** algorithm. Such algorithms are characterized by a finite set of rules, which are applied until they “reach fixpoint”, which means that applying any rule produces no change.

- For every **entry point** e to the program, compute the set of states S_e that can be reached from e by executing the program.
 - why top? Top models the program's inputs to the program.
- Set $C_{in}(x, s) = C_{out}(x, s) = \square$ for every point x in the program.
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
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
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
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
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- Because of **cycles**, all points must have values at all times during the analysis
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- The initial value \perp means “**we have not yet analyzed control reaching this point**”

Another example: dealing with loops



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(We went through this answer on the whiteboard.)

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
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 - (Most) locations start as \square
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 - Locations whose current value is c might become T
 - but never go back to \square !
 - Locations whose current value is T never change


Lattices & Orderings

This structure between values is called a *lattice*:



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How to read a lattice:

- abstract values **higher** in the lattice are **more general** (e.g., T is true of more things than 0)
- easy to compute **least upper bound**: it's the lowest common ancestor of two abstract values

Lattices (continued)

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 - *monotonicity*: implicitly captures that values only flow in one direction as the analysis progresses
 - we can rewrite rules 5-8 in our nullness analysis using lub:

$$C_{in}(x, s) = \text{lub} \{ C_{out}(x, p) \mid p \text{ is a predecessor of } s \}$$

Lattices (continued)

- least upper bound (“**lub**”) has useful properties:
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 - we can rewrite rules 5-8 in a

$$C_{in}(x, s) = \text{lub} \{ C_{out}(x, p) \mid p \text{ is a child of } s \}$$

lub is the reason dataflow analysis is an **algorithm**: because lub is monotonic, we only need to analyze each loop **as many times as the lattice is tall**

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
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 - thus, $C(x, s)$ can change at most **twice** (= lattice height minus one)

Another example: secure information flow

Analysis goal: report a warning if any *source* of secure information (e.g., a password) potentially connects to a public *sink*, like a display function


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
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
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
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- applications in security: e.g., secure information flow
- stand-in here for a broad class of dataflow analyses
- how would we build it?
 - we'll write a set of rules, just as we did for our nullness analysis

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
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
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- second step: **statement-by-statement rules** to express how this works

Secure information flow analysis: rule 1



$H_{in}(x, s) = \text{true}$ if s displays x publicly

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


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Recall, true means “if this ends up being a secret variable then we have a bug!”

Secure information flow analysis: rule 2


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Secure information flow analysis: rule 2

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This means any subsequent use of x is safe after we assign to it.



Secure information flow analysis: rule 2

Does this rule say anything about the `sanitize()` method?

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
This means any subsequent use of `x` is safe after we assign to it.

`x := sanitize(x)`

← *X = false*

← *X = ?*


Secure information flow analysis: rule 3



$$H_{\text{in}}(x, s) = H_{\text{out}}(x, s)$$

(if s does not refer to x)


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
if there is **even one** way to have a leak, we might have a leak!



$$H_{\text{out}}(x, p) = v \{ H_{\text{in}}(x, s) \mid s \text{ is a successor of } p \}$$

Secure information flow analysis: rule 5


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Secure information flow analysis: rule 5

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(To see why, imagine the next statement is `display(x)`. Do we care about `y`?)



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false is like \perp in our nullness analysis!


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
1. let all $H_{out}(\dots)$ = **false initially**
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3. once the analysis reaches a fixed point, **issue a warning** at any source (x, s) where $H_{out}(x, s)$ is true (= leaks sensitive information)

Secure information flow analysis: example



to the whiteboard!

Secure information flow analysis: example



(for those reading online later, solved on the whiteboard. This is the solution.)

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heuristic is a fancy word for “best effort”

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 - widely used in industry:
 - [ErrorProne](#) at Google, [Infer](#) at Meta, [SpotBugs](#) at many places (including Amazon), [Coverity](#), [Fortify](#), etc.

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Basetype

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Type qualifier Basetype

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`@Negative int x`

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`@NonConstant int x`

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The diagram illustrates the components of the qualified type `@Positive int`. A blue bracket under `@Positive` is labeled "Type qualifier". A red bracket under `int` is labeled "Basetype". A green bracket under both `@Positive` and `int` is labeled "Qualified type".

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designing better (more expressive, more usable, etc.) pluggable type systems is an area of active research (mine!)

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 - very high effort, but enables sound reasoning about complex properties (= worth it for very high value systems)

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- soundness theorems also usually make some **assumptions** about the code being analyzed (e.g., no calls to native code, no reflection)

Static analysis: summary

- static analysis is very good at enforcing **simple rules**
 - **much** better than humans at this
- all interesting semantic properties of programs are **undecidable**, so all static analyses must **approximate**
 - goal in analysis design is to **abstract away unimportant details**, but keep important details
 - **dataflow analysis** is one technique for static analysis
 - trade-offs between false positives, false negatives, analysis time
- soundness & completeness are **possible, but rare**
 - all soundness guarantees come with caveats about the TCB