

Lightweight Verification of Array Indexing

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ABSTRACT

In languages like C, out-of-bounds array accesses lead to security vulnerabilities and crashes. Even in managed languages like Java, which check array bounds at run time, out-of-bounds accesses cause exceptions that terminate the program.

We present a lightweight type system that certifies, at compile time, that array accesses in the program are in-bounds. The type system consists of several cooperating hierarchies of dependent types, specialized to the domain of array bounds-checking. Programmers write type annotations at procedure boundaries, allowing modular verification at a cost that scales linearly with program size.

We implemented our type system for Java in a tool called the Index Checker. We evaluated the Index Checker on over 100,000 lines of open-source code and discovered array access errors even in well-tested, industrial projects such as Google Guava.

1 INTRODUCTION

An array access $a[i]$ is in-bounds if $0 \leq i$ and $i < \text{length}(a)$. Unsafe array accesses are a common source of bugs. Their effects include denial of service (via crashes or otherwise), exfiltration of sensitive data, and code injection. They are the single most important cause of security vulnerabilities [42]: buffer overflows enabled the Morris Worm, SQL Slammer, Code Red, and Heartbleed, among many others, allowing hackers to, for example, steal 4.5 million medical records [22]. If all array accesses were guaranteed to be in-bounds, these attacks would be impossible. A run-time system can prevent out-of-bounds accesses, but at the cost of halting the program, which is undesirable. Despite decades of research, preventing out-of-bounds accesses remains an urgent, difficult, open problem.

An ideal technique for avoid out-of-bounds array accesses should satisfy the following criteria:

- *prevent* the vulnerability rather than merely detecting it at run-time and crashing the program.
- *efficient*, with no time or space overhead at run time.
- *compatible* with legacy code, which need not be rewritten.
- *sound*: prevents all bounds errors, rather than finding some and letting hackers and users encounter others.
- *precise*: issues few false positive warnings.
- *fast* analysis that works modularly and incrementally when the programmer makes a change.
- *deterministic* with regard to output and run time; small program changes do not have large or non-local effects.
- *comprehensible*: the user can understand why the analysis fails or succeeds, and the output localizes the actual error.
- *effective*: finds new bugs in real-world codebases.
- *usable*, without disproportionate effort or code clutter.

Many academic and industrial approaches have been put forward to address this important problem. These advances have made both theoretical and practical contributions to science and engineering. *Dynamic bounds checking* augments the program with run-time checks, crashing the program (i.e., by throwing an exception) instead of performing illegal operations. This widely adopted approach fails the first three criteria. Heuristic-based, compile-time *bug-finding tools* are useful for finding some defects, but provide no guarantee, failing the soundness criterion. Several types of sound static analyses could prevent bounds errors at compile time, though most sound tools have not been evaluated in substantive case studies. *Proof assistants* fail the compatibility, speed, and comprehensibility criteria: they require heroic effort to use and understand, and they require re-implementation of the program or the programming language. *Automated theorem provers* translate the verification problem into a satisfiability problem, then invoke a solver; they fail at comprehensibility and either speed or determinism. *Bounded verification* (model checking or exhaustive testing) is generally not sound. *Inference* approaches do not require programmer annotations but fail the speed, determinism, and comprehensibility criteria. Hybrid static-dynamic approaches trade off the criteria, but satisfy no more of them than their component approaches. Section 7 discusses related work in more detail and gives citations.

We propose to prove safety of bounds checks—equivalently, to detect all possible erroneous array accesses—via a collection of type systems. Typechecking is a nonstandard choice for this problem. In previous attempts, types were too weak to capture the rich arithmetic properties required to prove facts about array indexing, could be hard to understand, and cluttered the code. One of our contributions is to show that a carefully-designed collection of type systems—each specialized to a simple property—is an excellent fit to the problem.

A type system can satisfy all the criteria listed above. Typechecking happens at compile time. It can run within an existing compiler and is familiar to programmers. Our type system is sound (see section 6.1 for the usual caveats about our implementation). Every sound analysis suffers false positives, but ours issues fewer false positives than Java’s own type system does (table 3). Typechecking is modular and deterministic. Types systems specialized to a simple property do not require programmers to reason about the full complexity of dependent types. Our experiments show types are effective for array bounds checking. We hope our success inspires researchers to consider types as a practical approach in other challenging verification domains.

We have developed a set of lightweight, easy-to-understand type systems, which we implemented in a tool called the Index Checker. The Index Checker provides the strong guarantee that a program is free of out-of-bounds array accesses, without incurring the large human effort typically required for such guarantees. The Index Checker

scales to and finds serious bugs in well-tested, industrial-size code-bases. The Index Checker’s type systems are simple enough for developers to reason about yet rich enough to guarantee that real programs are free of indexing errors (or to reveal subtle errors). The Index Checker verifies that programmer-written type annotations are consistent with the code; that is, at run time, the values have the given type. This provides a documentation benefit: programmers cannot forget to write documentation of necessary indexing-related properties, the documentation is guaranteed to be correct, and the types are both more formal and more concise than informal English documentation.

We implemented our type systems for Java. Our work generalizes to other languages, because there is nothing about our type systems that is specific to Java. Our implementation handles arbitrary fixed-length data structures, such as arrays, strings, and user-defined classes. In fact, it found errors in collection classes defined in Google’s Guava library.

We evaluated our type system with three case studies on open-source code in everyday industrial use. The case studies show that the Index Checker scales to practical programs at reasonable programmer effort. The Index Checker found bugs in well-tested, widely-used code that were acknowledged and subsequently fixed by maintainers. Most importantly, it certified that no more array bound errors exist in checked code (modulo soundness guarantees).

The primary contributions of this paper are:

- Reducing array bounds checking to 7 kinds of reasoning.
- Modeling these kinds of reasoning as simple type systems.
- Our open-source implementation, the Index Checker, runs on Java, scales to large programs, and is distributed with the Checker Framework (<https://checkerframework.org/>).
- Case studies showing that the Index Checker finds bugs in real programs.
- A comparison of our type-based approach to other approaches.

2 VERIFICATION VIA COOPERATING TYPE SYSTEMS

An array access $a[i]$ is in-bounds if two properties hold: $0 \leq i$ and $i < \text{length}(a)$.¹ Sections 2.2 and 2.3 show how to establish them, thus proving an access safe. However, an analysis that computes only those two properties would flood the user with false positives. One of our contributions is identifying 7 kinds of knowledge (fig. 1) that are adequately precise in practice, and designing abstractions (type systems) for each. Each subsequent section gives an example of safe code that cannot be typechecked under the analyses shown so far, and shows how we enhanced our design to accommodate that code. These enhancements improve precision without affecting soundness.

2.1 Background

A type is a set of run-time values: an expression’s compile-time type is an overestimate of all its possible run-time values. Typechecking is a dataflow analysis that produces sound estimates of what a program may compute. Some of our types apply to integers, like Java’s `int`,

¹Evaluation of $a[i]$ could suffer other problems: a value could be undefined (e.g., uninitialized, deallocated memory, or `null`); the stack could overflow if array dereference is implemented as a procedure call; etc. Our work specifically addresses array indices being within their bounds.




Figure 1: Information flows between type systems. The type systems with two boxes ensure each array access is safe; the other type systems support the work of these two. A dashed line indicates flow of information from user-written annotations (see section 2.9).

Integer, etc. (sections 2.2–2.4, 2.7, and 2.8). Other types apply to fixed-length collections (sections 2.5 and 2.6). Every variable has one or more types from each type system at every point in a program.

Our implementation, the Index Checker, runs 7 cooperating type systems—those that run later can use information already computed by earlier type systems, as shown in fig. 1. Section 2.9 describes how to use rely-guarantee reasoning to permit mutual dependence between two type systems (the cycle in fig. 1).

The Index Checker uses some dependent types [44]. A dependent type is a type whose definition depends on a value, such as “an integer less than the length of array a ” or “an array of length 10”. A dependent type may mention a value or the name of a variable.

A *type qualifier* [24] refines a type by restricting the set of values it represents, meaning a qualified type is a subtype of the same unqualified type. Essentially, it is a separate type system that can be mixed into a base type system. The Index Checker uses Java’s type annotations to represent type qualifiers in Java source code. For instance, in the variable declaration `@Positive int i`, the type is `@Positive int`, which contains fewer values than `int` and is therefore a subtype of `int`. Each type system is modular and runs on one method at a time. Programmers write type qualifiers on fields and method signatures (formal parameter and return types). The Index Checker infers types within method bodies.

All of our type systems are flow-sensitive. For example, after a test `x.f > 0`, the type of `x.f` is `@Positive` until a possible side effect or a control flow join.

In our 6 new type systems, there are 80 type and inference rules beyond the standard ones. Each one is documented by a comment in the Index Checker implementation. This paper gives a few examples, but omits most of them because they are mostly obvious (this is a benefit of our simple type systems), and because of space limitations.

2.2 A type system for lower bounds

The first type system estimates a lower bound for each integer. Figure 2 shows the type hierarchy. An integer whose lower bound is




Figure 2: The type system for the lower bounds of integers. `@GTENegativeOne` stands for “Greater Than or Equal to Negative One”. In each diagram in this section, arrows are subtyping relationships, properties described by the types are on the left, and type qualifiers in the Index Checker implementation are on the right.

less than zero may not index an array. Two rules for this type system are $\frac{e_2 : @NonNegative}{e_1[e_2]}$ and $\frac{e_2 : @NonNegative}{e_1 \text{ } \&\& \text{ } e_2 : @NonNegative}$.

The simplest possible type system that would permit verification of (some) lower bounds would only include two types: non-negative and top. Our type system for lower bounds adds two additional types:

- (1) A type for positive integers, which is useful for one-based indices and for array accesses of the form `a[i-1]`.
- (2) A type for integers greater than or equal to -1, which is useful for loops that decrement the loop control variable by 1 and for `indexOf` methods which return -1 on failure.

For example, consider the following code from one of our case studies, which uses a one-indexed variable without documenting it:

```
/** Prints the matching item.
 * @param items the items to print from
 * @param itemNum specifies which item to print when
 *         there are multiple matches
 */
void printItem(Object[] items, int itemNum) {
    ...
    printItem(items[itemNum - 1]);
    ...
}
```

The Index Checker warns that `itemNum - 1` may be too low. The programmer should document `itemNum` as a 1-based index by declaring it as `@Positive int itemNum`. Then, the shown code type-checks, and the Index Checker also verifies that all clients of `printItem` respect its contract (i.e., all clients only pass `@Positive` integers for `itemNum`).

Our type system does not support other constant lower bounds; for example, it cannot express that $i \geq 2$. This design decision is intentional. Arbitrarily complex type systems require arbitrarily complex reasoning. Instead, the Index Checker uses focused type systems that are sufficiently expressive to verify array bounds in practice.

2.3 A type system for upper bounds

The index in an array access must be less than the length of the array. Figure 3 shows a dependent type system that soundly overestimates the relationship between all potential indices (i.e., integers) and the length of every array in scope. (The implementation is efficient, since it only stores types for relevant arrays.) The type rules issue a type error when an index might exceed the bound of the array it is accessing. An integer may have several upper bound types: for instance, i may be less than the length of a and also less than or




Figure 3: The type system for the upper bound of an integer i . `@LTLengthOf` stands for Less Than Length Of and has two arguments: (1) an array a and (2) an offset x . The offset can be an arbitrary expression, such as `y + 6` or `z.indexOf(w)`.

equal to the length of b . An access is safe if the index has at least one upper bound type that would permit it.

Every type in the upper bound type system also estimates an *offset* for the array. The variable plus the offset is less than the length of the array. Programmers usually omit the offset, which defaults to 0. The Index Checker infers offsets within method bodies, where they are most common. Each offset is an arbitrary expression. The Index Checker does best-effort sound reasoning. As is typical for static analysis tools, it uses top as an estimate for non-linear arithmetic and other constructs that are challenging for static analysis.

To see why offsets are necessary, consider the following code from one of our case studies:

```
public void concat(int[] a, List<Object> b) {
    int b_size = b.size();
    Object[] result = new Object[a.length + b_size];
    for (int i = 0; i < b_size; i++) {
        result[i + a.length] = b.get(i);
    }
    ...
}
```

`result[i+a.length]` is legal because i has type `@LTLengthOf("result.length", offset="a.length")`. An inference rule automatically infers this type, without the need for programmer annotations, because `result.length = b_size + a.length` (which is non-negative) and i is less than `b_size`. Another rule is:

$$\frac{e_1 : @LTLengthOf("e_4", \text{offset}="e_3.length") \quad e_2 : @LTLengthOf("e_3")}{e_1 + e_2 : @LTLengthOf("e_4")}$$

A programmer can give array a the type `@HasSubsequence("b", "startIndex", "endIndex")` to indicate that b is a view on a slice of a . This permits translation between indices for a and b .

2.4 Type systems for constants

The Index Checker obtains facts about indices and array lengths from an existing constant propagation and interval analysis. It provides three type qualifiers: `@IntRange(x, y)` represents an integer in the range x to y inclusive; `@IntVal(x)` is syntactic sugar for `@IntRange(x, x)`; and `@ArrayLen(x)` indicates that an array has exactly length x . In these type qualifiers, x and y are compile-time constants.




Figure 4: The type system for the minimum length of an array a . There is no top type since all arrays have zero or more elements.

Table 1: Type qualifiers for auxiliary type systems.

Section	Conceptual Type	Type Qualifier
§2.6	$a.length = b.length$	<code>T @SameLen("a") [] b</code>
§2.7	$i < j$	<code>@LessThan("j") int i</code>
§2.8	$ i < a.length$	<code>@SearchIndexFor("a") int i</code>

2.5 A type system for minimum array lengths

Consider this implementation of `min` from one of our case studies:

```
/** ... @param array a non-empty array ... */
public static int min(int @MinLen(1) ... array) {
    int min = array[0];
    for (int i=1; i<array.length; i++) { ... } ... }
```

The Javadoc states that the array must be non-empty, which the code relies on in `array[0]`. We expressed this formally as `@MinLen(1)`, and the Index Checker ensures that clients respect it. Figure 4 shows the type hierarchy.

2.6 A type system for equal-length arrays

This type system partitions all arrays in scope at each program point into sets, where all elements of each set have the same length. In a case study, we expressed that `xData` and `yData` have the same length:

```
double getSlope(Number[] xData, Number
    @SameLen("xData") [] yData) {
    ...
    for (int i = 0; i < xData.length; i++) {
        sxy = sxy + yData[i].doubleValue() *
            xData[i].doubleValue();
    }
}
```

The Index Checker verifies that both `yData[i]` and `xData[i]` are safe, and it rejects calls to `getSlope` where the arguments are not guaranteed to have the same length. Programmers rarely need to write `@SameLen` annotations; these annotations are inferred when two arrays are created using the same argument, when array lengths are tested against one another, etc.; for example, $\frac{\text{new } T[e.length] : @SameLen("e")}{\text{new } T[e.length] : @SameLen("e")}$.

The Index Checker uses a type system to express this partitioning. Each type represents one or more arrays with the same length as the array to which the type belongs. Although this representation is unusual, it permits the Index Checker to capture the partitioning in a way that retains the benefits of the type system approach. The transitivity of equality leads to an unusual least upper bound: if the two types have at least one array in common, then the least upper bound is the set of all of the arrays in either type. Otherwise, it is top.

2.7 A type system for simple linear inequalities

Consider the following annotated code from one of our case studies:

```
double calculateMedian(@LessThan("end + 1") int
    start, int end) {
    List working = new ArrayList(end - start + 1);
    ...
}
```

The `ArrayList` constructor argument must be non-negative. A type rule in the lower bound type system (section 2.2) establishes that `end - start + 1` is non-negative, using the `@LessThan` fact.

2.8 A type system for negative indices

The JDK’s `binarySearch` method returns either the index at which the target is present, or a negative value indicating where the target would be if it were present—that is, a negative index. The Index Checker models this contract with the type qualifier `@SearchIndexFor`. The type systems described in sections 2.2 and 2.3 infer expression types based on this information. For example, given an integer `i` of type `@SearchIndexFor("a")` that is known to be negative, then `i * -1` has the type `@LTLenghtOf("a")`. One case study had a bug where method should have returned `-1`, but instead returned the result of a binary search call. Before we implemented this type system, the Index Checker issued a warning at 14 calls to `binarySearch`, 13 of which were false positives. Afterward, it issued a warning only at the error.

2.9 Cyclic type system dependence

Each type system uses facts computed by previously-run type systems (fig. 1). Some examples include $\frac{e_1 : @MinLen(k_2) \quad k_2 < k_3}{k_3 : @LTLenghtOf(e_1)}$ (section 2.5) and $\frac{e_1 : @SameLen(e_2) \quad e_3 : @LTLenghtOf(e_1)}{e_3 : @LTLenghtOf(e_2)}$ (section 2.6).

In some cases, either of two type systems could benefit from the other running first. Two rules that are frequently needed in real-world code are $\frac{e : @Positive}{\text{new int}[e] : @MinLen(1)}$ and $\frac{e : @MinLen(k)}{e.length - (k-1) : @Positive}$. If the lower-bound type system (section 2.2) runs first, then the latter rule will never fire, because no types have `@MinLen` qualifiers yet. If the minimum-length type system (section 2.5) runs first, then the former rule will never fire.

One possible solution would be to run typecheckers multiple times until a fixed point, each time utilizing only knowledge that had already been established. However, we want to retain the speed of running each typechecker only once for each line of code.

Instead, the Index Checker uses rely-guarantee reasoning [32] to implement the mutual dependency. The analysis that computes minimum lengths of arrays runs first, and relies on (that is, assumes the truth of) any annotation that was explicitly written by the programmer. Doing so is safe because the Index Checker guarantees that the explicit positive annotation will be checked later by the type system in section 2.2.

This required an extension to the Checker Framework, which previously made no distinction between explicitly-written and inferred annotations.

3 IMPLEMENTATION

A programmer invokes the Index Checker by running `javac` with the `--processor` command-line option. The Index Checker produces type errors exactly as `javac` does.

Table 2: Annotations supported by the Index Checker as syntactic sugar for multiple annotations from the type systems of section 2.

Type Qualifier	Meaning
@IndexFor("a") int i	$0 \leq i < a.length$
@IndexOrHigh("a") int i	$0 \leq i \leq a.length$
@IndexOrLow("a") int i	$-1 \leq i < a.length$
@LengthOf("a") int i	$i = a.length$
@LTEqLengthOf("a") int i	$i \leq a.length$

In addition to the type qualifiers in section 2, every type system contains a bottom type \perp , which is the type of `null`. \perp is needed because the Index Checker handles all of Java’s numeric types (i.e., both `int` and `Integer`). Each type system also contains a qualifier that indicates qualifier polymorphism, enabling parametric polymorphism independently over Java types, qualifiers, and full types. The Index Checker has annotations that are syntactic sugar for combinations of annotations from two type systems (table 2) to help programmers express common invariants.

The Index Checker provides 1,238 annotations for the JDK (Java’s standard library), which we wrote based on the JDK’s documentation. These annotations are trusted but not checked; a future case study could verify the JDK implementation. The Index Checker’s users can write similar annotations for other libraries.

The Index Checker is open-source and distributed with the Checker Framework [43] (<https://checkerframework.org/>), industrial-strength, open-source tool for building type systems for Java that is used at companies such as Amazon, Google, and Uber. The framework abstracts some details of the analysis implementation (for instance, by modeling the heap), and automatically supports features such as flow-sensitive local type inference, Java generics, and qualifier polymorphism.

The Index Checker is implemented in 4400 lines of code. The Index Checker’s implementation consists of one typechecker for each type system in section 2. This structure keeps each typechecker relatively small and easy to understand. Each typechecker contains a definition of the type hierarchy, type rules, and inference rules.

The type and inference rules are implemented directly, without calls to an external solver. This increases the size of our implementation, but keeps its performance fast and predictable, and can be more expressive.

4 CASE STUDIES

We ran the Index Checker on three open-source Java projects (table 3) used previously to evaluate bug-finding and verification tools [8, 13, 26]. Our goal was either to verify that each was free of array indexing bugs, or to find and fix all their array indexing bugs.

We first read the developer-provided documentation and re-wrote it formally, as Index Checker annotations. Then, we ran the Index Checker, investigated each warning it issued, and took one of these actions: (1) Added missing annotations to an incomplete specification and re-ran the Index Checker. (2) Fixed a bug in the code and reported it to the maintainers. (3) Determined that the code was correct, but the Index Checker was not sufficiently powerful to prove it correct. We suppressed these false positive warnings.

Each case study was performed by someone who was not familiar with the codebase being checked but familiar with the Index Checker. We spent most of our time understanding subtle and/or

Table 3: A summary of the three case studies. Code size is non-comment, non-blank lines, as measured by `cloc` [12]. “Bugs fixed” is those fixed by the developers at the time of writing. “Annotatable locations” is the number of places that an annotation could be written (approximately all uses of integral and array types in the program). A “non-trivial check” of a type rule involves a type other than \top or \perp , such as array accesses, calls to procedures with annotated formal parameters, etc. “False positive %” is the number of false positives divided by the number of non-trivial checks.

	Guava*	JFreeChart	plume-lib	Total
Lines of code	10,694	94,233	14,586	119,503
Annotatable locations	10,571	65,051	12,074	87,696
Annotations	547	2,936	242	3,725
Bugs detected	5	64	20	89
Bugs fixed	5	11	20	36
False positives	114	350	43	507
Non-trivial checks	3,084	12,520	1,817	17,421
False positive %	3.7%	2.8%	2.4%	2.9%
Java casts	219	2,707	223	3,151

* Guava packages base and primitives.

Table 4: Annotation density: number of annotations written per line of code. A larger denominator implies the annotation is rarer. `@SearchIndexFor` only appeared in the JDK.

Annotation	Guava	JFreeChart	plume-lib	Overall
@NonNegative	1/139	1/50	1/228	1/59
@GTENegativeOne	1/972	1/1193	1/2917	1/1258
@Positive	1/446	1/2005	1/1216	1/1440
@LTLengthOf	1/891	1/7249	1/912	1/2915
@IntRange	1/563	1/688	0	1/766
@IntVal	1/10694	1/13462	0	1/14939
@ArrayLen	1/5347	1/819	1/503	1/819
@MinLen	1/191	1/1812	1/972	1/972
@SameLen	1/1528	1/1428	1/858	1/1328
@LessThan	1/289	1/18847	1/2084	1/2439
@SearchIndexFor	0	0	0	0
@IndexFor	1/281	1/202	1/521	1/224
@IndexOrLow	1/167	1/47117	1/3647	1/1707
@IndexOrHigh	1/67	1/4712	1/810	1/604
@LTEqLengthOf	1/891	1/9423	1/14586	1/5196
@LengthOf	0	1/2692	0	1/3415
@HasSubsequence	1/972	0	0	1/10865
All annotations	1/20	1/32	1/60	1/32

undocumented code and improving documentation or fixing errors. Reading the entire codebase was not necessary.

Overall, the case studies demonstrate three results:

- (1) The Index Checker scales to sizable programs.
- (2) The Index Checker finds real bugs even in well-tested programs. Every one of the bugs leads to a program crash. Of the bugs, 36 have so far been validated by maintainers. Details of the bugs appear in sections 4.1–4.3.
- (3) The Index Checker issues fewer false positives than Java’s type system. (Java programmers write a cast to suppress a false warning from the Java type system. The Index Checker handles casts soundly: it issues a warning at every annotated type downcast.) Sections 4.4 and 4.5 discuss false positives and annotation burden.

4.1 Guava case study

Guava [27] is Google’s general-purpose core libraries for Java. Guava is considered extremely reliable: it is used extensively in production at Google and elsewhere, and its test suite is larger than its code. We annotated two packages, `com.google.common.base` and `com.google.common.primitives`. Most of the uses of fixed-length sequences in `base` are strings, either directly or through the `CharSequence` interface. `primitives` uses arrays and defines custom fixed- and mutable-length collections. Much of the code is duplicated for each of Java’s eight primitive types.

We found 5 bugs in Guava, all of which were instances of the same programming mistake. The bug involves factory methods for immutable collections, which begin with code such as:

```
public static ImmutableIntArray of(int first, int...
    rest) {
    int[] array = new int[rest.length+1];
```

This code uses unchecked integer addition to compute the length of a new array. If the `rest` array has a length equal to `Integer.MAX_VALUE`, the addition overflows, and the method attempts to allocate an array of negative size. Guava’s maintainers classified this bug² as priority one³ and accepted our patch⁴ that documents the maximum allowed array length and checks this requirement at run time.

The Guava package `primitives` consists almost entirely of classes working with or representing sequences of Java primitive types. These classes require many annotations in their public interfaces, accounting for the relatively large number of annotations Guava required. For example, of the 160 total `@IndexOrHigh` annotations we wrote in the Guava case study, 114 were in this package on parameters of methods that take a pair of indices specifying a range in a sequence, such as:

```
List<Long> subList(@IndexOrHigh("this") int fromIndex,
    @IndexOrHigh("this") int toIndex) { ...
}
```

4.2 JFreeChart case study

JFreeChart [25] is used by Java application developers to include graphs and charts in their programs. It uses arrays and fixed-size structures extensively to represent data it draws onto charts.

The Index Checker found 64 bugs in JFreeChart, all of which would lead to crashes. Of these bugs, 24 were in code and 40 were in documentation. Of the code bugs, 14 were a failure to check an argument to a public method before using it as an index; 3 were inconsistencies between JFreeChart’s time classes and the JDK’s calendar class; and 2 resembled the bug shown in fig. 5. The other 7 code bugs all had different causes. The other 40 bugs involved undocumented assumptions made by code. Clients could pass values permitted by the documentation and cause a crash. We fixed these bugs by modifying the documentation to reflect the actual assumptions.

²<https://github.com/google/guava/issues/3026>

³The highest priority is zero, but the Guava team has never acknowledged a priority zero bug in their public repository.

⁴<https://github.com/google/guava/pull/3027>

```
static final int[] LAST_DAY_OF_MONTH
    = {0, 31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31, 31, 30, 31, 30,
        31};

public static SerialDate addMonths(int months,
    SerialDate base) {
    int totMm = 12 * base.getYYYY() + base.getMonth() +
        months - 1;
    int yy = totMm / 12;
    int mm = totMm % 12 + 1;
    int lastDayOfMonth = SerialDate.lastDayOfMonth(mm,
        yy);
    ...
}

public static int lastDayOfMonth(int month, int year)
{
    final int result = LAST_DAY_OF_MONTH[month];
    ...
}
```

Figure 5: The Index Checker found this bug in JFreeChart. The argument to `addMonths` may be negative, making `mm` negative and causing `lastDayOfMonth` to crash. For simplicity, the figure elides code for leap-year accounting.

The maintainers accepted our first two patches (fixing 11 bugs), then went dormant. As of this writing, there has only been one commit, and no fixed bugs or accepted pull requests, in over three months. Our third patch is pending, and we will file the remainder as our patches are accepted.

4.3 plume-lib case study

plume-lib [17] is a library of Java utility methods. Like Guava, it is well-tested: its JUnit tests contain 2,693 lines of code and 1,136 `assert` statements.

We found 20 bugs, all of which were fixed by the developers.

We fixed 9 code defects. One involved a table header that was printed even when the table itself was empty. Three were crashes due to unchecked, externally supplied indices; we added code that checks the user’s input and prints a user-friendly error message rather than a stack trace. One was an access to an array that might have zero length. One was a crash that would occur only when duplicate arrays were passed to a method. One was a case where an array’s length was checked, but then it was dereferenced unsafely anyway. Two were in routines that should have accepted ragged arrays, but used the length of the first subarray for all subarrays.

In 11 cases, methods were missing documentation about their requirements and assumptions; without the documentation we added, a user might have supplied illegal input and caused a crash.

4.4 Causes of false positives

Every sound type system rejects some safe programs that never perform an undesired operation at run time. If the programmer is confident the code is safe (due to manual, or other, verification), the programmer can suppress the warning. When using the Index Checker, this is expressed using Java’s `@SuppressWarnings` syntax.

The Index Checker issues 507 false positive warnings in our case study. This number may seem high, but it is less than the Java type system. Programmers wrote 3,151 casts to suppress false positives from the Java type system. (One could measure the percentage of reports that are false positives, but this would be primarily a measure

of code quality rather than tool quality. For any program, once its bugs are fixed, the percentage of reports that are false positives is by definition 100%. All our subject programs had high quality to begin with. The most effective way to use a typechecker is throughout development, not after testing and deployment.)

This section now discusses the three most common reasons for the Index Checker to issue a false positive in our case studies.

(1) The Index Checker is restricted to immutable length data structures (see section 6.2). When code relies on interoperability between mutable-length data structures and arrays, the Index Checker may issue false positives. For example, consider the following method from *plume-lib*:

```
public <T> T[] concat(List<T> a, T[] b) {
    T[] result = (T[]) new Object[a.size() + b.length];
    for (int i = 0; i < a.size(); i++)
        result[i] = a.get(i); // false positive
    ...
}
```

result’s length is greater than *a*’s size, so *i* is always an index for *result*, but the Index Checker conservatively assumes that *a*’s size might have changed before *i* is used to access *result*. Interfaces for custom collections with implementations that are backed by either an array or a list are another common example. In total, interactions between arrays and lists required 56 warning suppressions.

(2) *JFreeChart* commonly uses an object’s index to fetch it from another object that, by construction, must contain it. In these cases, *JFreeChart* correctly does not check for a -1 return value when calling *indexOf* methods. An example follows:

```
public class DefaultPolarItemRenderer {
    /** The plot the renderer is assigned to. */
    private PolarPlot plot;

    public LegendItem getLegendItem(...) {
        XYDataset dataset =
            plot.getDataset(plot.indexOf(this)); //f. pos
        ...
    }
}
```

Because *this* is a field in *plot*, *indexOf* cannot return -1 here even though its documentation indicates that it could. We suppressed 46 warnings caused by this pattern. Reasoning about an invariant like this is beyond the capabilities of the Index Checker.

(3) *JFreeChart* defines custom data structures that are backed by ragged arrays, called *Datasets*. Every method to access a *Dataset* requires two parameters: an index into the array of “series” (that is, other arrays), and an index into the corresponding series. For example, the definition of *getZ* in the *XYZDataset* is:

```
public Number getZ(int series, int item);
```

The Index Checker handles most uses of *Datasets* correctly, but a limitation of the Checker Framework causes 40 false positives when generic *Dataset* objects which have indexes in scope are casted to more specific subclasses of *Dataset*, like *XYZDataset*. These indexes are invalidated because they rely on another parameter: *item* is only an index when paired with a specific value *series*, not with every legal value of *series*.

4.5 Annotation burden and benefit

Table 4 shows how often each Index Checker annotation needed to be written. Verification is a difficult problem and provides strong guarantees, so some programmer effort is expected. The annotation burden is less than for Java generics, for 2 of the 3 subject programs; that is, the programs contain fewer Index Checker annotations than Java generic type arguments. The annotations are also much smaller than the programs’ test suites; this comparison is relevant because testing is another way to find errors, though in each of these programs the testing missed errors.

The annotations are more concise and precise than English, so writing them *reduces* the size of documentation. Because they are typechecked, they are more reliable than English documentation, which may be out of date. Therefore, the number of annotations is less a measure of programmer burden than a measure of documentation benefit.

5 COMPARISON TO OTHER APPROACHES

Array indexing bugs are an important problem in practice, so many tools have been built to detect them. We compared the Index Checker to three tools, representing three different approaches to the problem.

FindBugs: FindBugs is bug-finding tool widely deployed in industry [3]. It uses heuristic-based pattern-matching and static analysis. FindBugs emphasizes its low false-positive rate and ease of use; unlike the other tools, it does not aim to be sound. We used FindBugs version 3.0.1 and enabled all 9 bug patterns related to array or string indexing.

KeY [2] verifies Java Modeling Language (JML) [9, 34] specifications, which can express full functional correctness properties, using an automated theorem prover. We used KeY version 2.6.3, backed by Z3 [14] version 4.5.1. We translated Index Checker annotations to JML, and otherwise instructed KeY to verify the weakest possible contracts.

Clousot checks Code Contracts⁵ on .NET methods [21]. It works by abstract interpretation. We used the Code Contracts version 1.9.10714.2 extension to Microsoft Visual Studio Enterprise 2015 Version 14.0.25431.01 Update 3 with Microsoft .NET Framework Version 4.7.02556, with arithmetic and bounds checks enabled and the SubPolyhedra [33] abstract domain. We disabled contract inference to prevent Clousot from detecting that parts of some test cases are unreachable. We hand-translated code from Java to C# and Index Checker annotations to Code Contracts. We used equivalent classes and methods from the .NET Framework in place of JDK classes if there was a clear correspondence; otherwise, we wrote stub classes to mimic them. For example, we translated `new String(bytes, 0, pos)` to `Encoding.ASCII.GetString(bytes, 0, pos)`.

We first tried to run each tool on the case study programs from section 4 (section 5.1). We also ran each tool on an example of each bug found by the Index Checker that was accepted by developers (section 5.2). Finally, we compared Clousot to the Index Checker using the test suites of the two tools (sections 5.3 and 5.4).

⁵<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/debug-trace-profile/code-contracts>, <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/code-contracts/>

Table 5: Effectiveness of 4 tools in finding real indexing bugs in their default configurations.

	FindBugs	KeY	Clousot	Index Checker
True Positives	0/18	9/18	16/18	18/18
False Negatives	18/18	1/18	2/18	0/18

5.1 Case study programs

FindBugs neither found any bugs nor issued any false positives on the case study programs from section 4.

KeY failed to run on any of our case study programs. KeY is a whole-program analysis. The KeY distribution includes a tool to generate stubs for unavailable code, but the generated stubs omitted some JDK dependencies for each of our benchmarks. In addition, KeY fails to support many features of Java that are used in real-world code, such as generics, floating point numbers, several Java 7 features, and all Java 8 features.

We did not run Clousot on the case study programs because hand-translating each case study from Java to C# would have been prohibitively time-consuming.

5.2 Developer-accepted bugs

We categorized all the bugs that the Index Checker detected and the program’s developers fixed, into 18 categories. We created a minimized example of each, a few lines of code long. We also wrote corrected versions of these minimized examples. We then ran all four tools on these 36 code snippets (table 5).

Although KeY aims to be sound, its default configuration has a false negative: it verified as correct the buggy code from Guava. By enabling the most faithful Java integer semantics, KeY can detect the bug. As expected, KeY rejected the other buggy test cases. However, in 8 cases it gave the identical verification failure on the fixed code, indicating that the verification failure had nothing to do with the bug. In only 2 cases did KeY verify the correct code without additional input. In 7 cases, KeY did not verify the correct code, but gave a different verification failure than it did on the buggy code. We found ourselves unable to interpret KeY’s output to locate the bug, but we count these 7 cases as true positives in table 5 because a KeY expert might be able to do so.

Clousot is effective—it detected most of the bugs. In its default configuration, Clousot failed to detect two bugs, instead reporting that they were correct code. One involved conversion from an array of bytes to a string:

```
public static void doSession(InputStream stream,
    byte[] buf) {
    Contract.Requires(buf != null);
    int pos = stream.read(buf);
    string actual = Encoding.ASCII.GetString(buf, 0,
        pos);
    ...
}
```

The `InputStream.read` method returns -1 when the end of the file is reached. Client code should check it before using it as an index.

The other bug is the Guava bug involving overflow shown in section 4.1. Clousot has a command-line option for unsoundly checking overflow, which is disabled by default and is not available from the Visual Studio extension. With this command-line option enabled, Clousot finds the Guava bug.

Based on the results in table 5, we dropped FindBugs and KeY from further comparisons and focused on Clousot.

5.3 Index Checker’s test suite

We ran Clousot on the Index Checker’s test suite, which is a set of Java files containing correct and incorrect code with expected warnings. The Index Checker passes this suite with no false positive warnings. The tests are mainly real-world code encountered in our case studies, not corner cases designed to highlight the Index Checker’s particular strengths.

We translated the test suite into C#. We skipped tests that use JDK classes without a direct equivalent in .NET, tests that use bottom types, and tests that use polymorphic qualifiers (which cannot be expressed by Code Contracts). We also skipped tests that check whether particular Java features are handled correctly. The resulting test suite consists of 163 C# files containing 4,608 lines of code.

One of the tests revealed a bug in Clousot. Clousot incorrectly reported that the asserted condition is false, but it is always true:

```
int a = -1; int d = 2; int u = a / d;
Contract.Assert(u >= -1);
```

Clousot issued 56 false positives. The most common causes for Clousot to issue a false positive were: computing indices by division, max, min, and bitwise-and operations (20 warnings), inferring that arrays equal by `==` have the same length (10 warnings), and handling an array that contains all values of an enum type (5 warnings).

5.4 Clousot’s test suite

Clousot’s test suite is structured similarly to the Index Checker’s, with C# files and expected warnings. We translated the parts of the suite that check array accesses to Java, and the associated code contracts to Index Checker annotations. The resulting test suite contained 26 files with 2,633 lines of code. We did not write any type qualifiers for contracts or assertions that could not be expressed in our type system, such as preconditions that establish an inequality between indices.

The Index Checker produced 136 warnings, out of which 78 were true positives and expected warnings and 58 false positives. Eleven of these warnings were because the code contracts could not be translated into the Index Checker’s type systems. For example, the Index Checker does not have an annotation to express that the return value of a method is equal to the value of a field. The most common reasons for false positives were: the Index Checker failed to refine types of local variables after a check or in a loop (18 warnings), code that increments an independent index variable in a loop over an array (8 warnings), using a multiply of an index as a size of a newly allocated array (6 warnings). Clousot’s test suite includes many linear inequalities that are more complex than those handled by the type system in section 2.7. This is probably because complex linear inequalities are a strength of Clousot’s SubPolyhedra domain. For the Index Checker, we designed a cheaper analysis that issues few false positive warnings on the real-world code in our case studies. This suggests that Clousot’s test suite may be uncharacteristic of real-world code.

6 DISCUSSION

6.1 Limitations and threats to validity

Like any code analysis tool, the Index Checker provides guarantees only for code that it checks. The guarantee excludes native code, unchecked libraries such as the JDK, and dynamically generated code. The Checker Framework handles reflective method calls soundly [5]. Type casts do not affect soundness: the Checker Framework issues a warning at every annotated type downcast. The Index Checker makes no guarantees about mutable-length data structures such as Java Lists (see section 6.2). The Index Checker makes no guarantees about program behavior in the presence of overflow, though its best-effort analysis found some such errors in Guava (section 4.1).

Like any sound static analysis, the Index Checker cannot verify all correct code and produces some false positive warnings. A programmer must apply some other type of reasoning to such code; if the code is indeed safe, the programmer must suppress the warning. The Index Checker trusts that when a programmer suppresses a warning: (1) the code is safe, and (2) its annotations are correct.

Our results, while encouraging, may not generalize. If our subject programs are uncharacteristic, then the Index Checker might suffer more false positives or be harder to use. Over a dozen people have used the Index Checker, but its usability by programmers has not been established.

Our case studies demonstrate the Index Checker’s bug-finding power on well-tested, deployed code. Our case studies are a worst-case scenario for the tool’s usefulness. It would be both more useful and easier to use the Index Checker from the inception of a project. This would validate the program’s design and prevent bugs from ever entering the code. We chose our case studies to be array-heavy code; other code might not require as many annotations.

It is possible that our type system or the Index Checker implementation might contain errors. We have mitigated this danger by having multiple authors review every type rule and every line of code, and with a large test suite of 326 test cases and 8,003 lines of test code.

6.2 Fixed-length vs. mutable-length collections

Our type systems work for fixed-length collections, whose size does not change after the object is constructed. The Index Checker’s annotations can be written on type declarations and uses, which enables support both for JDK classes such as String and for user-defined classes. This works even for classes that do not extend Collection nor have one as a field, as long as the class’s abstraction represents more than one item. To specify that a class contains an array or collection field that acts as a delegate, the programmer writes `@SameLen` annotations (section 2.6).

Handling mutable-length collections is interesting future work and requires three things. The major part is tracking of indexing and lengths, which is already implemented and described in this paper. The second part is handling operations that change the size of a data structure, such as `add` and `remove`. This is not difficult, though it requires specifications about side effects (or their absence, for pure methods). The Checker Framework invalidates dataflow facts about expressions at all possible reassignments, including non-pure method calls. The third part is precisely tracking all aliasing, so that when one list’s length changes, the lengths of all (and only) aliased

lists are also changed. This is challenging, but it is not specific to array indexing and new implementations of alias analysis could be substituted in as the community develops them. We do not know whether any existing analysis would be sufficiently precise for our needs.

6.3 Types vs. expressions

The most closely related work, Clousot, checks specifications that are arbitrary C# expressions written at statement boundaries. By contrast, the Index Checker’s specifications are type qualifiers written on type uses. These differ in expressiveness, conciseness, and solver completeness.

Expressions are in general much more expressive than types. However, they are not strictly so. Unlike Code Contracts, types support polymorphism and variance. As an example, consider the following method fragment from the JFreeChart case study:

```
Map<@NonNegative Integer, CategoryDataset> datasets;
List<@NonNegative Integer>
getDatasetIndices(DatasetRenderingOrder order) {
    List<@NonNegative Integer> result = new
        ArrayList<>();
    for (Map.Entry<@NonNegative Integer,
        CategoryDataset> entry : datasets.entrySet()) {
        if (entry.getValue() != null)
            result.add(entry.getKey());
    }
    ...
    return result;
}
```

Clousot can use a quantifier to specify the requirement that the returned list should have non-negative elements: `Contract.ForAll(Contract.Result<List<int>>(), j=>j>=0)`. However, Clousot cannot check that only non-negative numbers are added to the list (because the `add` method doesn’t have a precondition requiring the argument to be non-negative), and cannot prove this property. On the other hand, the Index Checker can verify the whole method, using the fact that the values added to the list are keys from the dataset map which are non-negative, and similarly, wherever this method is called, use the fact that any integer retrieved from the list is non-negative.

Types are often more compact and easier to read. Expressing properties in the underlying programming language is convenient for tooling, but often verbose. Compare declaring `i` as `@IndexFor("a")` versus writing `Contract.Requires(i >= 0 && i < a.Length)`. Or, consider annotating an interface handling non-negative values:

```
public interface Values {
    public @NonNegative int getItemCount();
    public Number getValue(@NonNegative int index);
}
```

The corresponding Code Contracts:

```
[ContractClass(typeof(ValuesContract))]
public interface Values {
    int getItemCount();
    Number getValue(int index);
}
[ContractClassFor(typeof(Values))]
abstract class ValuesContract : Values {
    int getItemCount() {
        Contract.Ensures(Contract.Result<int>() >= 0);
    }
}
```

```

    return default(int);
}
Number Values.getValue(int index){
    Contract.Requires(index >= 0);
    return default(Number);
}
}

```

Using the underlying language is sometimes convenient, but can significantly clutter the code: Clousot requires a ghost definition of an abstract class just to write the specifications.

A significant difference is that a programmer can predict whether the Index Checker can verify a program’s correctness. When a programmer states an argument for why each array access in a program is legal, if the facts in this argument are expressible in the Index Checker’s language, then the Index Checker will verify the program’s correctness (unless the Index Checker has a bug). By contrast, using expressions to represent facts about the program allows arbitrarily complex reasoning, so programmers cannot predict whether Clousot will succeed or fail.

Although the Index Checker’s specifications are more restrictive, they are effective in practice. The Index Checker’s design also makes verification significantly faster. Though a direct comparison is impossible (because the tools operate on different languages), Clousot takes 222 minutes to check Boogie [4] (85664 LOC) and timed out on 9 methods, whereas the Index Checker takes 8 minutes to check JFreeChart (94233 LOC), on the same commodity hardware. The design of a set of types that is sufficiently expressive, yet efficient to check, is one of our contributions.

7 RELATED WORK

The most common approach to array bound errors is dynamic checking, which crashes the program rather than permitting an unsafe operation. Most modern languages build this into the run-time system, and tools such as Purify [29] and Valgrind [41] do it for unsafe languages like C. These checks incur significant time or space overhead, despite research on reducing their cost [7, 46]. Other research aims to integrate bounds checks into unsafe languages [10, 16, 31, 39, 40, 50, 53]. Fundamentally, the goal of these approaches is to safely crash the program when an out-of-bounds array access would occur at run time. By contrast, the Index Checker imposes no run-time cost, and it prevents the program from crashing due to array bounds mistakes.

The classic dynamic approach of allocating, maintaining, and checking shadow bits can be performed statically via a dataflow analysis [18, 19]. An early example [49] was notable in not using the standard approach of unsound heuristics, but instead creating an infinite chain of approximations to the general loop invariant, using the “weakest liberal precondition”.

Bug-finders such as FindBugs [3] and Coverity [6] are easy to use and useful in finding some errors. Unlike the Index Checker, their heuristics are too weak to find all errors and they offer no guarantees.

Extended Static Checking [15, 23, 36], KeY [2], and Dafny [35] translate verification conditions into the language of powerful satisfiability engines or automated theorem provers, such as Z3 [14]. This is the dominant paradigm in bounds verification and in some other types of program analysis. Unlike the Index Checker, these tools suffer brittleness or instability: a small, meaning-preserving change

within a method implementation may change the tool’s output from “verified” to “failed” or “timeout”, or might lead to different diagnostics in unrelated parts of the program [30, 37]. Scalability and usability are also challenges.

Wei et al. [51] evaluated different program analyses, including representations for integers and heap abstractions. They and we both found that polygons are expensive and not very helpful; simpler analyses can suffice.

Other researchers have applied dependent type systems to the problem of array bounds. With Xi and Pfenning’s dependent type system for a subset of SML [52], programmers write nearly arbitrary arithmetic linear inequalities, a type elaboration phase propagates them to unannotated expressions and collects a set of inequalities for the entire program, and then a solver for linear inequalities (such as Fourier variable elimination or the Omega Test [45]) is applied. It was evaluated on 8 procedures, and the annotation overhead was 17% of lines or 31% of characters. Liquid types [47] use the same type system but provide better inference, reducing the annotation overhead by combining type inference with predicate abstraction. The Dsolve tool found a bug in the Bitv library, then verified the array safety of 58 of its 65 routines, requiring 65 lines of annotations to verify 30 array access operations. No information is given about the unverified routines. The Index Checker’s type system is more limited but works without an external solver. It has been designed to scale to real code with few false positives. ESPX [28] uses a dataflow analysis to find buffer overflows in C programs. It scales to large programs, but is unsound even on its own benchmarks. A type system with only upper and lower bounds [48] found 16 errors in one program. It is simpler than the Index Checker, but less general and has a higher false positive rate.

Abstract interpretation is as expressive as type systems [11], though in practice the two approaches lead to analyses that feel very different. Clousot or ccheck [21] has a number of similarities to the Index Checker: it is automated, checks programmer-written specifications, combines a set of interdependent analyses, works modularly, and performs some inference. Section 6.3 notes that Clousot’s abstract domains are richer than the Index Checker’s. Clousot was inspired by the limitations of theorem provers that we noted above.

The key challenge in designing a program analysis is to select abstractions that are sufficiently precise, yet still efficient. The Clousot authors found that octagons and intervals were too imprecise, buckets exacerbated non-determinism, and polyhedra were too inefficient. They settled on disjunctions of intervals, upper bounds, pentagons [38], linear inequalities, and SubPolyhedra [33] (a novel abstraction that is as expressive as Polyhedra, but has more limited inference). Clousot is non-deterministic, because it must apply a timeout to its long-running analysis. The Clousot researchers do not discuss case studies in which they examined Clousot’s output, nor any bugs that it revealed [20, 21, 33, 38]. Clousot issues a false positive at over 10% of array bounds [33]. We have found that our choice of abstractions is simpler, more concise, more precise, faster, and effective in practice, and our implementation is more sound. Clousot made great strides, and the Index Checker makes significant further advances toward its vision.

8 CONCLUSION

The Index Checker occupies a new point in the design space of static analysis tools for array-bounds violations. It is fast and incremental. Unlike other scalable and simple tools, the Index Checker can find complex bugs and is sound—it provides a proof of correctness. Its technical approach is cooperating type systems, which are familiar to any developer writing in a statically typed language. We hope that this blend of the power of verification with the ease of use of a bug-finding tool will allow more developers to avoid array bounds violations.

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